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ABSTRACT
In this study, the use of procedural fairness by a buying organization in an electronic reverse auction
(ERA) is examined. Drawing on the literature, a conceptual model is developed that relates
procedural fairness to two key ERA outcomes: relationship quality and quality of the offering. The
hypothesized relationships between procedural fairness and quality outcomes are empirically tested
through a global field study with 179 procurement professionals in multinational companies, and
explored through a supporting field study with 31 sales professionals from supplier firms. The results
show that the use of procedural fairness by a buying organization is positively related to relationship
quality and quality of the offering, without jeopardizing price savings. In addition, the positive
association between procedural fairness and relationship quality is found to increase in the case of a
repeat auction. This study contributes to the relationship marketing literature by examining how
procedural fairness can mitigate relationship quality concerns in ERA use by buying organizations.
© 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Over the past two decades, Electronic reverse auctions
(ERAs) have seen their popularity increase in vari-
ous industries including aerospace, automotive, avia-
tion, chemicals, construction engineering, defense, elec-
tronics, machinery, packaged goods, petroleum, retail,
and telecommunications (Beall et al., 2003; Radkevitch,
Heck, & Koppius, 2009). An ERA is defined as “an on-
line, real-time dynamic auction between a buying or-
ganization and a group of pre-qualified suppliers who
compete against each other to win the business to sup-
ply goods or services that have clearly defined specifica-
tions for design, quantity, quality, delivery, and related
terms and conditions. These suppliers compete by bid-
ding against each other online over the Internet using
specialized software by submitting successively lower
priced bids during a scheduled time period” (Beall et al.,
2003, p. 7).
The proportion of ERA sourcing, in relation to the
total annual spend of a firm, ranges from less than
5% to up to 25%, with potential applicability as high
as 50% (Beall et al., 2003; Jap, 2007). Private indus-
try data reveal that firms mostly use ERAs in non-
strategic spend pools such as rawmaterials, packaging,
logistical services, temporary labor, and transporta-
tion, which amount to 20–40% of a firm’s total annual
spend, of which 35% is sourced electronically. As an ex-
ample of the absolute spend ERAs can account for, the
METRO group, the fifth largest retailing group in the
world, has run thousands of ERAs to purchase products
worth more than 1 billion euro (Ganesan, George, Jap,
Palmatier, & Weitz, 2009).
The popularity of ERAs stems from the tremendous
price savings auctions can potentially yield, with av-
erage reported price savings of 15%, and a reported
5–40% price savings range (Ganesan et al., 2009). Ad-
ditional benefits for the buying organization include a
reduction in cycle time, enhanced productivity, an en-
larged supply base, and accelerated inventory replen-
ishment (Carter et al., 2004; Smeltzer & Carr, 2003).
Incentives for the supplier organization to participate
in ERAs include the opportunity to win new business,
access new markets, obtain price information, and re-
alize efficiency gains (Beall et al., 2003; Canie¨ls & van
Raaij, 2009; Smeltzer & Carr, 2003).
While ERA use can benefit both buying organiza-
tions and suppliers, the one-sided focus on price sav-
ings as well as unethical behavior by both buyers and
suppliers can prevent them from achieving such advan-
tages (Beall et al., 2003). Examples of unethical behav-
ior by buyers include the buying organization inviting
unqualified suppliers to the ERA to exert price pres-
sure on qualified suppliers, holding auctions for price
discovery only (without the intent of awarding the busi-
ness), providing incomplete or incorrect demand spec-
ifications, allowing certain suppliers to rebid after the
closing date, frequently repeating the ERA to the point
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of supplier bankruptcy, threatening the supplier to end
the relationship in the absence of bids, and purpose-
fully cancelling the deal after the auction as buyer ex-
pectations are not met. Suppliers’ unethical behaviors
include illegal arrangements between suppliers to not
bid, selectively bid, or keep the price high, tenaciously
hurting competitors bymaking unrealistically low price
bids without the intention of being awarded the busi-
ness, and not honoring the deal by deliberately reducing
quality of the offeringwithout informing the buyer or by
adding extra fees after the auction (Arnold, Ka¨rner, &
Schnabel, 2005; Carter et al., 2004; Charki, Josserand,
&Charki, 2010; Gullett et al., 2010; Hohner et al., 2003;
Tassabehji, Taylor, Beach, & Wood, 2006).
As a result, the use of ERAs is widely recognized
as severely harming buyer–supplier relationships and
quality of the offerings (Beall et al., 2003; Canie¨ls & van
Raaij, 2009; Carter & Stevens, 2007; Carter et al., 2004;
Charki & Josserand, 2008; Jap, 2007; Jap & Haruvy,
2008; Ray, Jenamani, & Mohapatra, 2011; Tassabehji
et al., 2006). In particular, when conducting an ERA,
a buying organization often terminates a long-term re-
lationship with the incumbent supplier. According to a
supplier, in a study by Jap (2000): “[The buyer] talks
about the relationship being a partnership, and this
[the auction] really takes that away . . . What they do
is take your existing business that you have worked
very hard to achieve and maintain . . . and they send it
out across the board for a competitive bid. I just do not
think that is fair.”
While the use of ERAs by buying organizations
raises substantial concerns about the quality of the
relationship with suppliers and about the quality of
the offering, there is a paucity of research that focuses
on mechanisms for alleviating these adverse outcomes.
The objective of this study is to examine how the em-
ployment of procedural fairness by a buying organi-
zation in an ERA relates to relationship quality, and
quality of the offering, controlling for price savings and
other potentially confounding factors. In particular, a
buying organization can conduct an ERA in a procedu-
rally fair manner by clearly explaining and communi-
cating the auction rules and conditions to participant
suppliers, and by adopting objective procedures that do
not discriminate between the suppliers participating
in the auction (Carter et al., 2004; Kumar, Scheer, &
Steenkamp, 1995).
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, it
adds to the relationship marketing literature by exam-
ining the role of procedural fairness in enhancing rela-
tionship quality and quality of the offering inERAs for a
buying organization. This study illustrates that a “rela-
tional auction is not an oxymoron” (Daly&Nath, 2005a,
p. 173) and points to the importance of procedural fair-
ness in relationship marketing for influencing quality
outcomes. Second, it offers empirical support through
a global field study involving 179 buying profession-
als, as well as exploratory insight through a supporting
field study with 31 sales professionals at supplier orga-
nizations, showing that the use of procedural fairness
by a buying organization is positively associated with
quality outcomes in ERA use, without jeopardizing
price savings. It also shows that the positive association
between procedural fairness and relationship quality
increases in case of a repeat auction.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next
section, procedural fairness and quality outcomes in
ERAs are reviewed, a conceptual model is presented,
and hypotheses are developed. Then, the research
method is described, and in a following section, the re-
search results are presented. Finally, findings, impli-
cations, and limitations are discussed and the paper is
concluded.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
In this section, prior literature on procedural fairness
and the impact of ERA use on relationship quality and
quality of the offering in buyer–supplier relationships
is reviewed, and hypotheses are developed.
Procedural Fairness
The principle of fairness is probably as old as human
interaction itself. Records of fairness go back as far as
2500 years. Fairness or justice (the concepts have been
used interchangeably) concerns equal treatment and
the justification of departures from equality, and has
been studied extensively in the organizational justice,
social psychology, and economic literatures (Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999; Folger&Cropanzano, 1998; Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Maxwell, Nye, & Maxwell,
1999; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Research on fairness distinguishes between dis-
tributive and procedural fairness (Hartman, Yrle,
& Galle, 1999; Huffman & Cain, 2001; Ndubisi,
Nataraajan, & Lai, 2014). While distributive fairness
pertains to the fairness of the division of benefits
and burdens, related to decision outcomes (Frazier,
Spekman, & O’neal, 1988), procedural fairness refers
to the fairness of the procedures through which deci-
sions are made or rules applied (Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Another form of fairness that has been identified in
the literature is interactional fairness, which is defined
as the interpersonal treatment people receive as pro-
cedures are carried out (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt,
2001; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Luo (2008), Moorman
(1991), andNiehoff andMoorman (1993) consider inter-
actional fairness to be a subset of procedural fairness.
In this study, the focus is on procedural fairness.
This is in keeping with Tyler and Lind (1992), who offer
two arguments for the manifestation of procedural fair-
ness as the key category of fairness. First, distributive
outcomes are considered one-time responses to partic-
ular situations, unlike procedures that have a more en-
during quality. Second, before one can assess distribu-
tive fairness, one has to have a good understanding of
the other parties’ relative efforts and rewards, which is
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often hard to obtain. Likewise, Kumar et al. (1995) draw
from Tyler and Lind (1992) and highlight the central
role of procedural fairness in their study of marketing
channel relationships, stating that a distributive out-
come is at least partly determined by external factors,
whereas procedures are directly attributable to one’s
actions and therefore indicative of one’s fairness.
In a review of the procedural justice literature,
Konovsky (2000) refers to both objective and subjec-
tive procedural fairness, and assumes that objective
procedural fairness leads to subjective justice percep-
tions, which Konovsky (2000, p. 492) defines as “per-
ceptions of objective procedures or to the capacity of
an objective procedure to enhance fairness judgments.”
In the organizational justice literature, procedural
fairness is viewed as a means to generate favorable
outcomes (Brockner, 2002; Konovsky, 2000). More
specifically, procedural fairness is concerned with
the fair process effect (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, &
Corkran, 1979), which is as follows: “the more someone
considers a process to be fair, the more tolerant that
person is about the consequences of the process, such
as adversely unfair outcomes that a decision-making
process creates when it governs the distribution of out-
comes” (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, p. 32).
In the setting of an ERA, procedural fairness can
be defined as the fairness of the procedures through
which the buying organization makes decisions or ap-
plies rules when interacting with the suppliers partic-
ipating in the ERA (Amelinckx, Muylle, & Lievens,
2008; Kumar et al., 1995). The study of procedural
fairness in ERAs is promising, as procedural fairness
has been studied in other interfirm relationship set-
tings before. Kumar et al. (1995) found that procedural
fairness enhances relationship quality between rela-
tively smaller, vulnerable resellers and larger, power-
ful suppliers. Likewise, Vinhas, Heide, and Jap (2012)
found supplier fairness and consistency in economic
payoffs to positively influence relationship outcomes
with resellers. De Clercq and Rangarajan (2008) found
procedural justice to be positively related to rela-
tionship outcomes in entrepreneur–customer dyads.
Ndubisi et al. (2014) found fairness to be positively
related to relationship quality and commitment, as
perceived by customers of legal service providers. Luo
(2008) found that procedural fairness improves both
operational and financial cooperation outcomes in al-
liances. Finally, Chiu, Huang, and Yen (2010) found
that fairness in online auctions positively influences
trust of bidders.
In addition, prior exploratory research has proposed
procedural fairness as an influencing factor in ERAs
(Daly & Nath, 2005a; Tunca, Wu, & Zhong, 2013).
Charki et al. (2010) highlight the importance of con-
sidering fairness in addressing ethical concerns in ERA
use for balanced buyer–supplier relationship outcomes,
as ERAs are considered zero-sum outcome mechanisms
that contradict the generally accepted moral princi-
ple of fairness in traditional negotiation. Likewise,
Amelinckx et al. (2008) and Carbone (2008) recommend
buying organizations to be transparent and ethical for
effective ERA use.
Hypotheses Development
The conceptual model, shown in Figure 1, illustrates
the hypothesized relationships between procedural
fairness and quality outcomes in an ERA. In this model,
procedural fairness is hypothesized to be positively as-
sociated with relationship quality and quality of the
offering. In addition, these associations are hypothe-
sized to be positively moderated by the repeat nature
of the ERA. The hypotheses below allow us to explore
these predicted relationships.
Relationship Quality. Relationship quality is con-
cerned with the level of trust and commitment in a
buyer–supplier relationship, and is defined as “the
overall depth and climate of the interfirm relation-
ship” (Bejou, 1997; Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987; John-
son, 1999, p. 6; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Ndubisi, 2014).
Relationship quality captures important relational at-
tributes including trust, commitment, coordination,
conflict, and information sharing (Anderson & Narus,
1990; Ellram &Hendrick, 1995; Jap, Manolis, &Weitz,
1999; Ndubisi, 2013; Sriram & Stump, 2004; Stump &
Sriram, 1997; Wilson, 1995). However, the use of ERAs
often prevents realizing the various benefits associated
with long-term buyer–supplier relationships, such as
superior financial performance, increased levels of cus-
tomer satisfaction, organizational learning, partners’
propensity to stay, acquiescence by partners, and de-
creases in uncertainty (Hunt, Arnett, & Madhavaram,
2006; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).
Prior research focusing on preserving relationship
quality in ERA use has been sparse. Daly and Nath
(2005a,b) propose several principles that can be used
to render ERAs more relationship friendly. However,
these principles involve price concessions, which are
generally deemed inacceptable for buying organiza-
tions that conduct ERAs as a means to save money
(Emiliani & Stec, 2005). In addition, Smart and
Harrison (2003) concluded that when ERAs are used
primarily as a process improvement tool (instead of
as a price weapon), the effect on the relationship is
not necessarily harmful. Also, Ray et al. (2011) pro-
pose a relationship-preserving mechanism in ERA use
for a limited supplier base, consisting of intermittently
awarding business as well as a penalty scheme for
untruthful behavior.
Furthermore, Jap (2003, 2007) and Jap and Haruvy
(2008) propose specific auction attributes that render
auctions more relationship friendly, and provide em-
pirical evidence regarding the impact of these auction
attributes on the interorganizational relationship as
perceived by the supplier. In a quasi-experiment, in-
volving six ERAs conducted by a single buying or-
ganization, Jap (2003) finds that open bid (full price
visibility) auctions adversely affect buyer–supplier
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H1a + Relationship Quality Procedural Fairness 
H1b +
Quality of the Offering Control variables:
Price savings 
Price visibility 
Size of the purchase contract 
Number of lots 
Number of bidders 
Specifications of the offering 
H2b +H2a +
Repeat Auction
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
relationships. Furthermore, Jap (2007) states that
a buyer–supplier relationship is affected by two at-
tributes of the ERA: auction design and price/event dy-
namics. Through a quasi-experimental research study,
using 25 ERAs conducted by four buying organizations
in a variety of industries, Jap (2007) shows that a
large number of bidders (with a maximum of 12), a
large number of lots, a substantial size of the purchase
contract, partial (rather than full) price visibility, and
moderate price drops benefit the buyer–supplier re-
lationship. Furthermore, Jap and Haruvy (2008) find
aggressive bidding behavior to be detrimental for suc-
cessive relationship building, and longer auction events
to be gentler on the relationship.
While these studies offer valuable insight regarding
the impact of specific mechanisms and auction design
attributes on the buyer–supplier relationship, there is a
paucity of research that examines the role of procedural
fairness in the interaction between the buying organi-
zation and the supply base in ERA use. In keeping with
the literature, establishing and implementing fair pro-
cedures can enact the fair process effect and benefit the
buyer–supplier relationship.
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H1a: Higher procedural fairness is associated with
higher relationship quality.
Quality of the Offering. While prior research has
mainly focused on relationship quality, quality of the of-
fering has also been identified in the literature as a key
ERA outcome (Charki & Josserand, 2008; Jap, 2002).
Quality of the offering is defined as “a perceived fun-
damental characteristic of products and services which
meet or exceed the buying organization’s expectations
regarding features and performance as described in the
demand specifications” (Calantone & Knight, 2000, p.
495). The buying organization’s objective of producing
substantial price savings is at odds with the goal of
suppliers to maintain or increase prices. In response to
the one-sided focus on price competition, the supplier
may harm the quality of the offering, shirk on commit-
ments, remove value-added services or key intangibles
(e.g., delivery reliability, product support, responsive-
ness), and damage its relationship with the buyer once
the contract has been awarded (Carter et al., 2004; Jap,
2002, 2003, 2007). Furthermore, Elmaghraby (2007)
states that, in response to ambiguous specifications,
suppliers may bid too aggressively, lowering the qual-
ity of the offering they are willing to supply. Also, Jap
(2007) notes that if the price drops below a level that is
credible in relation to industry norms, the buyer may
have included unqualified suppliers in the ERA project.
Finally, Canie¨ls and van Raaij (2009) argue that sup-
pliers that aim to compete on quality (instead of price)
refrain from taking part in ERAs.
However, the buying organization can benefit from
employing procedural fairness and thereby evoke the
fair process effect (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), lead-
ing the supplier to act in the interest of the buying
organization. Through the implementation of fair pro-
cedures and processes, a buying organization can in-
fluence the supplier to become more tolerant about the
consequences of the auction and motivate the supplier
to provide adequate quality offerings, hence enabling
the buying organization to achieve desired outcomes.
Considering the above, the following hypothesis is for-
mulated:
H1b: Higher procedural fairness is associated with
higher quality of the offering.
Repeat Auction. A buying organization typically sets
up a repeat auction after a period of time for an identi-
cal or similar offering, especially for products with reg-
ularly changing markets (Beall et al., 2003). Jap and
Haruvy (2008) refer to the use of auctions in industrial
relationships as more than one-shot deals, and argue
that such procurement auctions are ongoing structures
that can affect behavior over the course of the rela-
tionship. While H1a and H1b explore the relationships
of procedural fairness to quality outcomes in an ERA,
these relationships might be different because of the re-
peated nature of the event. For example, in a game the-
ory experiment involving a principal–agent relation-
ship, Anderhub, Ga¨chter, and Ko¨nigstein (2002) found
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that in a repeated game the importance of fairness
increased. Likewise, according to the buyer–supplier
relationships literature (e.g., Dwyer et al., 1987), pro-
cedural fairness becomes increasingly important as the
relationship progresses. For instance, Kumar et al.
(1995, p. 57), in a study of supplier–reseller relation-
ships, state that: “actions and policies must be per-
ceived as fair for the relationship to deepen into a longer
term commitment.” Therefore, the following hypothe-
ses are formulated:
H2a: In a repeat ERA, higher procedural fairness is
more strongly associated with higher relation-
ship quality, as compared to a first-time auc-
tion.
H2b: In a repeat ERA, higher procedural fairness is
more strongly associated with higher quality
of the offering, as compared to a first-time auc-
tion.
Control Variables. From prior research, confounding
factors were identified, which have been related to qual-
ity outcomes in ERA use. These factors, as shown in
Figure 1 and described below, were controlled for in
this study.
The rationale to control for price savings, which is
defined as the percentage change in contract price com-
pared to the historical price (or, if not available, the
estimated market price) (Beall et al., 2003; Jap, 2007;
Smart & Harrison, 2003), is in keeping with the be-
lief that the buying organization attributes a dispro-
portionate amount of attention to the pricing aspect in
an ERA (Jap, 2007). If the price drops below a level that
is credible in relation to industry norms, the quality of
the offering may become unacceptable. In addition, (in-
cumbent) suppliers may infer that the buyer is using
the ERA opportunistically to acquire additional price
concessions, negatively impacting relationship quality
(Jap, 2007). Controlling for price visibility, which is de-
fined as the degree to which suppliers can see the bids
of other suppliers during the auction (Jap, 2003), is
consistent with the observation that the less visible the
price in an auction, the more positive is the impact on
various ERA outcomes, including price savings and the
buyer–supplier relationship (Jap, 2003, 2007).
The higher the economic stakes (size of the purchase
contract) and the higher the number of lots, the higher
is the motivation for suppliers to participate in an ERA
(Grewal, Comer, & Mehta, 2001; Jap, 2007). Accord-
ing to Grewal et al. (2001), higher contract value mo-
tivates the supplier to be responsive to and supportive
of the buyer, favorably impacting the buyer–supplier
relationship. In keeping with Grewal et al. (2001), the
posited relationship between number of lots and size of
the purchase contract, and relationship quality, was ac-
counted for, as well as their potential impact on quality
of the offering.
Also, the number of bidders in the ERA was con-
trolled for, as an increase in the number of bidders
provides a credible signal to suppliers that the buy-
ing organization is aware of realistic alternatives and
is doing its due diligence to keep purchasing prices in
check (Jap, 2007). However, if too many bidders partici-
pate, this becomes unrealistic and potentially increases
price competition, which may lead to lower quality of
the offering and suspicions of buyer opportunism (Jap,
2007).
Finally, the rationale to control for the extent to
which the buyer is able to clearly define the specifica-
tions of the offering, also referred to as “specifiability”
in the ERA literature (Beall et al., 2003; Kaufmann
& Carter, 2004; Wagner & Schwab, 2004), is in keep-
ing with the observation that ERAs are less success-
ful for offerings that have ambiguous specifications
(Beall et al., 2003; Jap, 2002). As a response to am-
biguous specifications, suppliers may either bid overly
cautiously, resulting in lower price savings, or too ag-
gressively, lowering the quality of the offering they are
willing to supply (Elmaghraby, 2007). Furthermore,
Beall et al. (2003) argue that ERAs can improve re-
lationship quality by removing some of the ambiguity
about market prices and forcing both buyers and sup-
pliers to be very clear about the specifications of the
offering.
RESEARCH METHOD
To empirically test the conceptual model, a main study
was conducted with procurement professionals at buy-
ing organizations. To account for potential bias in their
perception of fairness, a supporting, exploratory field
study was conducted involving sales professionals at
supplier organizations.
Main Study
The population of interest to the main study consisted
of procurement professionals in multinational compa-
nies, who were (co)responsible for a completed elec-
tronic sourcing project that involved an ERA. Four
electronic sourcing consultants and service providers
active in Europe and the United States, and two pro-
curement associations in Europe provided contact data
of procurement professionals at customer firms. To en-
sure that only knowledgeable informants participated
in the study, the respondents had to meet specific qual-
ifications (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Phillips,
1981). As a result, only procurement professionals that
had engaged in multiple ERAs before and that were
(co)responsible for a recent ERA project, participated
in the study. By instructing the respondent to refer to a
recently completed electronic sourcing project involving
anERA, recall decay bias was controlled for. The key in-
formant (Campbell, 1955) provided factual information
with respect to the price savings and the repeated na-
ture of the auction (as obtained from the auction record)
and was asked to evaluate the other constructs in this
study by means of an online survey. To reduce the
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influence of socially desirable responses, respondents
were allowed to answer anonymously, and the order of
the questions in the online survey was changed (Pod-
sakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).
In total, 851 personally addressed e-mail mes-
sages with personal salutations were sent (Barron &
Yechiam, 2002; Joinson & Reips, 2007), with an invita-
tion to participate in the online survey. As an incentive,
all respondents were offered a summary of the research
study results. The respondents were also assured that
their identity and their responses would remain confi-
dential and only reported in the aggregate. To further
increase the response rate, follow-up e-mails were sent
(Fan & Yan, 2010). Nonresponse bias was controlled for
by comparing the responses of early respondents with
late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). No sta-
tistically significant differences were found on any of
the constructs considered in this study; therefore non-
response bias did not appear to be a problem.
Usable responses were provided by 179 procurement
professionals. As data concerning ERAs are regarded as
“unique and enormously difficult to obtain” (Jap, 2007,
p. 147), the sample size of this study can be considered
exceptional in the field. Furthermore, this sample size
represents an effective response rate of 21.03%, which
is generally considered satisfactory for an industrial
survey (Erdogan & Baker, 2002; Frohlich, 2002). On
average, respondents had 9.33 years of purchasing ex-
perience. The most frequently occurring job titles were
purchasing manager, global sourcing manager, supply
chain manager/director, and purchasing analyst. The
ERA projects involved a wide range of industries, from
automotive, chemicals and consumer goods, to phar-
maceuticals, services, and telecommunications. The
market offerings that were auctioned included IT hard-
ware, palm oil, cokes, pallets, packaging material, of-
fice cleaning, temporary labor, transportation, car leas-
ing, consultancy, facility management, and logistical
services. The respondent companies were distributed
around the globe, with 77% of the companies being
headquartered in Europe, 15% in the United States,
and the remaining 8% in other regions of the world.
Supporting Study
As the buying organization’s perception about their use
of procedural fairness in the ERA is potentially biased
(the buying organization is likely to believe that it is
procedurally fair), a supporting study with sales profes-
sionals at supplier organizations was conducted. The
electronic sourcing consultants and service providers
that provided the contact data of buying professionals
for the main study were bound by confidentiality agree-
ments, precluding them from sharing contact data of
the sales professionals at supplier organizations that
participate in ERAs. Hence, no supplier contact data
from these sources could be made available for the
supporting study, and a dyadic buyer–supplier re-
search study design was impossible. To explore the
hypothesized relationships from a supplier perspective,
a convenience sample (Ferber, 1977) of 31 sales profes-
sionals at supplier organizations that recently bid in
an ERA, and that were awarded (part of) the business,
was drawn from a variety of sources. In keeping with
the approach of the main study, the respondents of the
supporting study were qualified and asked to complete
an online survey, taking similar measures to reduce
recall decay bias and social desirable response bias.
On average, the respondents in the supporting study
had 14.75 years of sales experience. The most fre-
quently occurring job titles were sales manager, sales
director, and account manager. The ERAs in the sup-
porting study involved a wide range of industries,
from consumer goods, electronics, IT, and manufactur-
ing, to packaging, services, and telecommunications.
The market offerings that were auctioned included
IT hardware and consultancy services, office sup-
plies, routers and switches, transportation and main-
tenance services, packaging material, electricity, and
gas.
Measures
The measures, used in both the main and the support-
ing study, were obtained from the literature. The word-
ing of the measurement items was modified for use
in an ERA setting, and adjusted to either the buyer
or supplier perspective. The measures were pretested
qualitatively with four academics and three domain ex-
perts from industry, as well as quantitatively with 24
respondents at buying organizations, after whichminor
modifications and refinements were made. Appendix A
provides the measures, the Cronbach alpha values, and
the factor loadings for the main study. Appendix B pro-
vides the measures for the supporting study.
The focus of this research is on subjective procedu-
ral fairness: procedural fairness as perceived by the
respondent. This is in keeping with Carter et al. (2004)
who note that ethical concerns, whether actual or sim-
ply perceived, can damage the buyer–supplier relation-
ship. Procedural fairness was measured using a three-
item scale, adapted from prior research (Kumar et al.,
1995; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The four items measur-
ing quality of the offering were adapted from Stanley
and Wisner (2001), and those for relationship qual-
ity were adapted from Stump and Sriram (Sriram &
Stump, 2004; Stump & Sriram, 1997). Each of the
multiitem scales was measured on a 7-point Likert
scale. The control variables were measured through
numerical, binary, or single-item scales, obtained from
the ERA literature (Beall et al., 2003; Carter et al.,
2004).
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
To further validate the measures, the psychometric
properties of the key constructs in the main study (pro-
cedural fairness, relationship quality, and quality of the
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Table 1. Squared Correlation between Constructs (Shared Variance) and AVE Values (Shaded Cells).
Mean Min Max SD 1 2 3
1. Procedural fairness 6.36 4 7 0.67 0.72
2. Relationship quality 5.13 2.67 7 0.90 0.17 0.62
3. Quality of the offering 5.38 3.33 7 0.81 0.11 0.29 0.73
offering) were evaluated by conducting a confirmatory
factor analysis. SPSS Amos 19.0 (Arbuckle, 2010) was
used to specify the relations of the observed measures
to their posited underlying constructs (Anderson &
Gerbing, 1988). The overall fit indices of the measure-
ment model compared favorably against common cut-
off criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999): chi²(89) = 157.79 (p
< 0.01); CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.91; NFI = 0.89; RMSEA
= 0.07. Standardized item factor loadings exceeded the
0.7 threshold (Hulland, 1999), except for two items (the
factor loadings are listed in parentheses after the corre-
sponding items in Appendix A). These two items were
retained as their respective item factor loadings were
still above 0.6, in keeping with Hulland (1999) who sug-
gests an absolute minimum value of 0.4. Furthermore,
the t-values of all item factor loadings were significant
at the 0.01 level. In addition to statistical consider-
ations, Baumgartner and Homburg (1996) suggest to
retain items that add substantial meaning to their re-
spective construct in order to increase the probability
of tapping all facets of the construct of interest. All
constructs have a Cronbach alpha value above the 0.7
threshold (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1991). Convergent
validity was assessed using composite reliability (CR)
(Werts, Linn, & Joreskog, 1974) and average variance
extracted (AVE) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). All CRs ex-
ceeded the 0.7 criterion, ranging from 0.86 to 0.91, and
all AVEs were above the 0.5 recommended level, rang-
ing from 0.62 to 0.73. Discriminant validity for all the
constructs in the model was confirmed. The AVE values
exceeded the shared variance (squared interconstruct
correlations; see Table 1), indicating that all constructs
shared more variance with their measures than with
other constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 1 fur-
thermore reports the means, SDs, and squared correla-
tions for the multi-item variables of the main study.
The likelihood of common method bias in the main
study was assessed by using the procedure suggested
by Podsakoff et al. (2003). A confirmatory factor anal-
ysis indicated that a single (method) factor did not fit
the data, providing evidence that interitem correlations
were not purely driven by method bias (chi² = 704.92
[df = 119; p < 0.001]; CFI = 0.54; TLI = 0.41; NFI =
0.51; RMSEA = 0.17). Furthermore, a test of the mea-
surement model, including common method bias as a
construct, did not offer a better fit of the data than the
measurement model (p = 0.11). Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that the constructs under study were mea-
sured through a larger survey on electronic sourcing
(Standaert, Muylle, & Amelinckx, 2015). It is therefore
unlikely that the respondents would hold a “theory”
about the hypothesized relationships.
Table 2. Results for the Hypothesized Paths (H1a,b):
Standardized Regression Weights.
Relationship
Quality
Quality of
the Offering
Procedural fairness 0.40∗∗ 0.30∗∗
Control variables
Price savings −0.03 0.01
Price visibility 0.03 0.13
Number of lots 0.00 −0.01
Size of the
purchase
contract
0.21∗ 0.27∗∗
Number of bidders −0.08 0.10
Specifications of
the offering
0.02 0.13
N = 179
R² 22.3% 23.8%
∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.001.
RESULTS
In this section, the results of the data analyses are re-
ported. In section “Main study,” the results for themain
study are described. In section “Supporting study,” the
exploratory results for the supporting study are pre-
sented.
Main Study
To test H1a and H1b, a structural model was specified
in which procedural fairness is related to relationship
quality and quality of the offering. Furthermore, the
control variables were included in the analysis. Impos-
ing these paths and allowing the variables to correlate
freely, resulted in a structural model with the exact
same fit indices as the measurement model specified
above.
Table 2 displays the estimated standardized regres-
sion weights. The association between procedural fair-
ness and relationship quality was significant and posi-
tive, providing strong support for H1a. Strong support
was also found for H1b. The R²-values indicated the
model explained a considerable portion of the variance
in both outcome variables. The estimated standardized
regression weights for the control variables are not sig-
nificant, except for the relationships between size of
the purchase contract and relationship quality, and be-
tween size of the purchase contract and quality of the
offering.
To test the moderation effects (H2a and H2b), a
multiple group analysis was conducted in Amos 19.0
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates in Both Groups (H2a,b).
Relationship Quality Quality of the Offering
First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat
Procedural
fairness
0.29∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.51∗∗
N 121 58 121 58
R² 17.3% 38.4% 19.3% 50.4%
∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.001.
(Arbuckle, 2010). The data were split into two groups
according to the repeated nature of the ERA: first-time
(N1 = 121) or repeat event (N2 = 58). The unconstrained
model, which allows for different measurement and
structural parameters across both groups, indicated a
good fit: chi² (180) = 333.447 (p < 0.01); CFI = 0.89;
TLI = 0.81; NFI = 0.80; RMSEA = 0.07. Measure-
ment invariance, which consists of metric and scalar
invariance, was tested across both groups by means of
a chi-square difference test (Jo¨reskog, 1971). Measure-
ment invariance was supported as the metric invari-
ant model did not differ significantly from the uncon-
strained model (chi² = 12.02; df = 8; p = 0.15), and
the scalar invariant model did not differ significantly
from the metric invariant model (chi² = 6.66; df = 11;
p = 0.83).
For reasons of parsimony and power, the structural
weights of the relationships between the control vari-
ables and the outcome variable were set equal across
groups in the measurement invariant model, serving
as a reference model to test the moderation effects (chi²
(211) = 366.85 [p < 0.01]; CFI = 0.89; TLI = 0.84; NFI
= 0.78; RMSEA = 0.07). This model did not differ sig-
nificantly from the measurement invariant model (chi²
= 14.72; df = 12; p = 0.26). Table 3 reports the esti-
mated standardized regression weights for the hypoth-
esized relationships and provides the primary basis of
comparison for the tests of moderation that follow. In
addition, Table 3 details the R2 values, showing that
the amount of variance explained by the explanatory
variables increased for relationship quality and quality
of the offering in the case of a repeat auction.
The potential moderating effects were tested by con-
straining the regression weight of the relationship be-
tween procedural fairness and the respective outcome
variables to be invariant across both groups. To test the
validity of each of the two constraints, a chi-square dif-
ference test (Jo¨reskog, 1971) was conducted comparing
the fit of the constrained model to the fit of the refer-
ence model. The results of the two corresponding chi²
difference tests are shown in Table 4.
As the deterioration in fit, compared to the reference
model, was significant for the first model (p = 0.03),
evidence was found for a moderation effect. The direc-
tion of the moderation effect was found to be positive,
as can be seen in Table 3, providing support for H2a.
The deterioration in fit for the second model, compared
to the model in which it was nested, was not significant
(p = 0.17). Hence, no support was found for H2b.
Table 4. Moderation Effect on Hypothesized Paths
(H2a,b).
Invariant path across both
groups Model Chi²
Chi²
Difference
1. Procedural
fairness—relationship quality
371.83 4.98∗
2. Procedural fairness—quality
of the offering
368.73 1.88
∗p < 0.05.
Supporting Study
To explore whether the hypothesized relationships be-
tween procedural fairness and both relationship quality
and quality of the offering hold in the minds of supplier
organizations, the data collected from sales profession-
als were analyzed. Table 5 reports the mean scores and
SDs of themain constructs in the supporting study, and
the interconstruct Pearson correlations.
The results of the correlation analysis showed that
the use of procedural fairness in an ERA by the buy-
ing organization as perceived by the sales profession-
als was positively correlated with relationship quality
(r = 0.62; p < 0.001), but not with quality of the offer-
ing (r = –0.12; p > 0.05). While these findings provide
further support for H1a, they show no support for H1b.
Furthermore, the data included responses related to
both first-time (N1 = 14) and repeat (N2 = 17) auctions,
allowing for further exploration of themoderation effect
of the repeat nature of the event. Table 6 presents the
correlations between procedural fairness and both re-
lationship quality and quality of the offering, for both
first-time and repeat auctions. Given the small sam-
ple sizes in these groups, the reported correlations are
Kendall’s tau-b values.
The nonparametric correlation between procedural
fairness and relationship quality was significant and
positive for both a first-time and repeat auction. The
Table 5. Mean Scores of Constructs and
Interconstruct Correlations.
Mean Min Max SD 1 2 3
1. Procedural
fairness
4.96 2.67 7 1.14 1
2. Relationship
quality
3.63 1.25 6 1.22 0.62∗ 1
3. Quality of the
offering
4.83 2.50 7 1.07 −0.12 0.11 1
∗p < 0.001.
Table 6. Correlations (Kendall’s tau-b) in a First-Time
and Repeat Event.
Relationship Quality Quality of the Offering
First-Time Repeat First-Time Repeat
Procedural
fairness
0.48∗ 0.44∗∗ −0.32 0.18
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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correlation between procedural fairness and quality of
the offering was not found to be statistically significant
for both a first-time and repeat auction.
DISCUSSION
The empirical results of themain study provide support
for the hypothesized relationships between the use of
procedural fairness by a buying organization in an ERA
and quality outcomes. In addition, partial support was
found for the moderating role of the repeat nature of
the ERA. The analysis points to four key insights.
First, procedural fairness is found to be positively
associated with relationship quality. This suggests that
buying organizations can alleviate concerns about rela-
tionship quality by treating the suppliers in a proce-
durally fair manner. A verbal account from a buyer,
as reported in the exploratory case study research of
Amelinckx et al. (2008, p. 130), illustrates the point:
“Online biddingwas viewed as a fair and efficientway of
negotiating total price and supplier relationships were
still considered important. Further, communication to
suppliers was key and was managed through a well-
prepared, consistent, and ethical approach: ‘The key
message that we communicate is that e-sourcing is not
a game. We don’t play with suppliers. You have to stick
to some ethical rules.’” Furthermore, the exploratory
insights from the supporting study with sales profes-
sionals offer preliminary evidence that the positive as-
sociation between the use of procedural fairness by
the buying organization and relationship quality also
seems to hold for supplier organizations.
Second, the hypothesized relationship between pro-
cedural fairness and quality of the offering is found
to be positive. This suggests that buying organizations
can evoke the fair process effect, which may lead the
supplier to be more tolerant about the consequences of
the ERA and not to compromise on the quality of the
offering. However, in the supporting study, no signifi-
cant correlation between procedural fairness and qual-
ity of the offering was observed, suggesting that suppli-
ers may not consider the use of procedural fairness by
the buying organization in responding to their require-
ments for quality of the offering.
Third, the positive association of procedural fair-
ness with relationship quality is found to increase in
a repeat auction, which suggests a progressive posi-
tive influence of procedural fairness as the buying or-
ganization continues to employ ERAs and benefit from
the fair process effect in its relationships with sup-
pliers. As to the supplier data, while procedural fair-
ness seems to be positively associated with relation-
ship quality for both a first-time and a repeat auction,
a moderation effect cannot be inferred from this small
data set.
Finally, the positive association of procedural fair-
ness with quality of the offering is found to in-
crease in a repeat auction, albeit not in a statistically
significantmanner. Although no significantmoderation
effect was observed for the hypothesized relationship
between procedural fairness and quality of the offering,
the increase in the regression weight of that relation-
ship in the main study suggests that there may be a
progressive positive association for the buying organi-
zation. As to the supplier study, no significant nonpara-
metric correlations between procedural fairness and
quality of the offering were observed for both first-time
and repeat auctions.
In summary, this study provides theoretical and em-
pirical support for the positive association between pro-
cedural fairness and relationship quality, and for an
increase of the positive association of procedural fair-
ness with relationship quality in a repeat auction. The
findings collectively support the notion that procedural
fairness is a key consideration for buying organizations
when using ERAs.
Theoretical Implications
The study adds to emerging research on relationship
marketing in ERAs, by revealing a positive associa-
tion between procedural fairness and key ERA qual-
ity outcomes, both for first-time and repeat auctions.
While prior research widely supports the proposition
that ERAs are detrimental to both quality of the of-
fering and relationship quality, as ERAs are primarily
focused on price savings (Jap, 2002, 2003), the find-
ings from this study suggest that a buying organization
can potentially obtain price savings while maintaining
quality of the offering and relationship quality by or-
ganizing the ERA in a procedurally fair manner. These
findings also support the notion that a relational auc-
tion does not necessarily have to be an oxymoron (Daly
& Nath, 2005b).
In addition, the study provides further evidence of
the robustness of the fair process effect across areas of
investigation (van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke,
1997). While the fair process effect originated in social
psychology, in which it has been frequently replicated,
this work demonstrates the role of the fair process effect
in a buyer–supplier relationship, in which ERAs are
used.
Managerial Implications
In the context of an ERA, managers of buying orga-
nizations can employ procedural fairness to preserve
quality relationships and offerings, without jeopardiz-
ing price savings. Organizing an ERA in a procedurally
fair manner involves treating all suppliers similarly,
applying consistent policies and decision-making pro-
cedures across all suppliers, and treating the suppliers
with respect (Kumar et al., 1995; Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Moreover, in the case of repeat auctions, managers can
further enhance relationship quality by continuing to
be fair in their procedures and policies.
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The results relating to the influence of the control
variables on the ERA outcomes under study are also of
importance to practitioners. As shown in Table 2, the
size of the purchase contract is the only control variable
having a significant impact on the ERA quality out-
comes. This finding confirms Jap’s point that “stakes
matter” (2007, p. 156) and that managers should
strive for auction events with large contract values. As
contract value increases, suppliers are increasinglymo-
tivated to be responsive to and supportive of the buy-
ing organization, which favorably impacts the buyer–
supplier relationship (Grewal et al., 2001).
Limitations and Directions for Future
Research
This study has certain limitations. The cross-sectional
research design limited the ability to determine causal-
ity between procedural fairness and quality outcomes
in ERAs. Reciprocal relationships are possible, for ex-
ample, between procedural fairness and relationship
quality. A repeated measures longitudinal design to ex-
plore the relationships posited in the conceptual model
and the possible reciprocal relationships could shed ad-
ditional light on the relationships over the course of
repeat auctions.
In addition, while this study explored the supplier
perspective on procedural fairness and ERA quality
outcomes to evaluate the potential bias that could be
introduced by asking representatives of buying orga-
nizations about their use of procedural fairness in
the ERA, a dyadic buyer–supplier research design
could offer more insight into the potential difference
in the perceptions of the buying and the correspond-
ing supplier organizations. However, given that field
data for a single ERA are enormously difficult to ob-
tain (Jap, 2007), collecting longitudinal, dyadic buyer–
supplier data would be an exceptionally daunting
task.
Also, respondents were asked to choose a recently
completed ERA in which they participated and to base
their answers on their experience with and percep-
tions of this ERA. Since it is human nature to recall
memorable events, it may be that the chosen ERAs
are those that ran particularly positive or negative
(Arnold et al., 2005), excluding random selection of
ERAs.
Furthermore, a single respondent evaluated all the
constructs, as a representative of the ERA project team.
This raises the issue of common method bias, the in-
fluence of which was estimated to be unlikely in the
main empirical study. In addition, by considering the
perspectives of supplier organizations, the possibility
for common method bias is further alleviated. That be-
ing said, having multiple members of a team respond
would not only further alleviate common method bias,
it would also offer additional insight into ERA project
team dynamics. This constitutes an interesting avenue
for future research.
CONCLUSION
The key research question that motivates this study is
how the use of procedural fairness in an ERA by a buy-
ing organization is associated with relationship qual-
ity and quality of the offering. This paper draws from
organizational justice literature to answer this ques-
tion and identifies procedural fairness as a key factor
in addressing quality outcome concerns. In particular,
a buying organization can employ procedural fairness
and obtain desired quality outcomes by virtue of the fair
process effect. Based on an empirical field study, involv-
ing 179 procurement professionals at buying organiza-
tions around the world, as well as an exploratory field
study, involving 31 sales professionals at supplier or-
ganizations, higher procedural fairness was found to be
associated with higher relationship quality and higher
quality of the offering, while controlling for price sav-
ings. In addition, the study found the repeated nature
of an ERA to positively moderate the association be-
tween procedural fairness and relationship quality. It
is our sincere hope that this study serves as a founda-
tion for further investigations seeking to examine the
use of procedural fairness in ERAs.
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APPENDIX A: MEASURES USED IN THE
MAIN STUDY1
Procedural Fairness (Adapted from Kumar
et al., 1995; Tyler & Lind, 1992; α = 0.88)
During the electronic sourcing project, our company
(1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree)
 did not discriminate but rather treated all suppli-
ers similarly; (0.85)
 applied consistent policies and decision-making
procedures across all suppliers; (0.88)
 treated the suppliers with respect. (0.82)
Relationship Quality (Adapted from Sriram
& Stump 2004; Stump & Sriram, 1997; α =
0.85)
The relationship with the current, active supplier(s)
that won the business through this electronic sourcing
project was characterized by
(1 = to a very little extent and 7 = to a very large
extent)
 mutual trust; (0.88)
 information sharing; (0.91)
 overall co-ordination; (0.63)
 relationship commitment. (0.65)
Quality of the Offering (Adapted from
Stanley & Wisner, 2001; α = 0.91)
How do you rate
(1 = very low and 7 = very high)
 the overall product/service quality? (0.81)
 the quality of the delivered product/service? (0.86)
 the quality of the product/service compared to your
specifications? (0.86)
 the quality of the product/service compared to your
expectations. (0.89)
Repeat Auction (Adapted from Arnold et al.,
2005)
For this product/service, the electronic sourcing
project was a:
 first-time or one-time event;
 repeat event.
Control Variables
Price Savings (Adapted from Beall et al., 2003;
Jap, 2007; Smart & Harrison, 2003). What was the
percentage change (±) in contract price compared to the
1 Standardized factor loadings from the measurement model are
listed in parentheses after the relevant item.
historical price or, if no historical price was available,
to the estimated market price that resulted from the
electronic sourcing project?
Price Visibility (Jap, 2003). Was there (partial) price
visibility during the ERA?
(Yes–No)
Number of Lots (Jap, 2007). What was the number
of lots in the ERA?
(1 = 1 to 10; 2 = more than 10)
Size of the Purchase Contract (Jap, 2007). From a
supplier’s perspective, the size of the purchase contract
that was awarded through this project was large.
(1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree)
Specifications of the Offering (Adapted fromBeall
et al., 2003). The product/service category was clearly
specified in terms of quality.
(1 = to a very little extent and 7 = to a very large
extent)
Number of Bidders (Jap, 2007). How many suppli-
ers were invited to the ERA?
APPENDIX B: MEASURES USED IN THE
SUPPORTING STUDY
Procedural Fairness (Adapted from Kumar
et al., 1995; Tyler & Lind, 1992)
During the electronic sourcing project, the buying com-
pany
(1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree)
 did not discriminate but rather treated all suppli-
ers similarly;
 applied consistent policies and decision-making
procedures across all suppliers;
 treated the suppliers with respect.
Relationship Quality (Adapted from Sriram
& Stump 2004; Stump & Sriram, 1997)
The relationship with the buyer that awarded the
business through this electronic sourcing project was
characterized by
(1 = to a very little extent and 7 = to a very large
extent)
 mutual trust;
 information sharing;
 overall co-ordination;
 relationship commitment.
Quality of the Offering (Adapted from
Stanley & Wisner, 2001)
How do you rate
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(1 = very low and 7 = very high)
 the overall product/service quality?
 the quality of the delivered product/service?
 the quality of the product/service compared to the
buying organization’s specifications?
 the quality of the product/service compared to the
buying organization’s expectations.
Repeat Auction (Adapted from Arnold et al.,
2005)
Did you participate in an electronic reverse auction
project organized by the same buying organization, for
the same or a similar product/service, before?
 No
 Yes
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